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" Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer. It advances the view that the Developing World
did not exploit its relatively strong bargaining position in negotiations over
sidepayments and that the concessional ten-year grace period for Jess
developed countries is a cause of instability of the agreement. The paper
derives conditions under which sidepayments and sanctions can produce
stable cooperation. It applies basic non-cooperative game theory and the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as solution concept and compares the
non-cooperative outcome with the Nash bargaining solution of a
hypothetical cooperative game.
The authors are solely responsible for the contents of each Kiel Working Paper. Since the series
involves manuscripts in a preliminary form, interested readers are requested to direct criticism
and suggestions directly to the authors and to clear any quotations with them.1. Introduction
The history of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) is a remarkable story. It tells about success-
ful research, high-rising industrial production of CFCs for numerous purposes and the
emergence of a pressing global environmental problem — the destruction of the earth's
ozone layer — which can only be solved by international cooperation. Table 1 lists the
most important stages.
Table 1 — CFC history
1930 Thomas Midgley Jr. discovers the CFCs (Shea 1988:18).
1974 World-wide production of CFC-11 and -12 reaches 800,000 tonnes annually.
1
1974 Molina and Rowland present the theory that CFCs destroy the stratospheric
ozone layer.
1978 CFCs in aerosols (spray cans) are banned in the USA.
2
1985, spring The ozone hole over Antarctica is discovered (Farman et al. 1985).
1985, March The "Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer" is adopted. The
Parties to the Convention accept the general obligation to protect the ozone layer.
The convention provides for joint research and mutual information.
1987, September The "Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer" is adopted.
The Protocol imposes a time table for the phase-down of consumption of CFCs
(50% by the year 2000) and a freeze of halons.
1990, June The Parties to the Montreal Protocol meet in London. The Protocol is adjusted
and amended. Provisions for a complete phase-out of CFCs (by the year 2000),
halons and some other ozone depleting substances are introduced.
1992, November The Parties to the Montreal Protocol meet in Copenhagen. They decide to phase
out the production of CFCs by the end of 1995 (as had already earlier been an-
nounced by the USA and the EC) and to stop halons by the end of 1993.
3 The
Parties also adopt new or stricter phase-down provisions for other compounds.
In reaction to the Copenhagen decision, the EC brings its own CFC-phase-out
deadline forward to the end of 1994.
4
The main virtue of the CFCs is their chemical stability. They are not toxic, since they do
not react with other chemicals, and they are not inflammable. Moreover, they are cheap
to produce. CFCs are ideal as a coolant in refrigeration (Freon), as a foam blowing
agent (Styrofoam), as aerosol propellants in spray cans and as a solvent in the electronic
1 Production data for the countries reporting to the Chemical Manufacturers Association. EPA (1987),
here adopted from Morrisette (1989:795).
2 On the long discussion about possible damage to the ozone layer in the USA see Morrisette (1989).
3 "Bush verfiigt Produktionsverbot fur FCKW bis 1995", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 February
1992. M. Simons, "Ozone Peril is Shocking Europeans into Action", International Harald Tribune, 4
March 1992. "Schon ab 1996 Verzicht auf schadliche FCKW", Nachrichten fur AuBenhandel,
Eschborn, 2 December 1992.
4 "Umweltminister bcschlieBen scharfere Abgaswerte ...", Handelsblatt, 17 December 1992.industry and in dry-cleaning. Halons, a similar chemical, are mainly used in fire
fighting.
5
In 1986, world consumption of CFCs and halons was 1,140,000 tonnes with a total
ozone depletion potential of 1,232,000 tonnes.
6 Production shares were for North
America 29%, West Europe 37%, East Europe 12%, Asia, Pacific and Latin America
22%. In 1984/85, per capita consumption of CFC-11/12 was around 0.85 kg in the USA
and in the EC; in China it was 0,02 kg. The data show a weak relationship between CFC
consumption and GNP of roughly 60 tonnes per billion dollars of GNP. (All data UNEP
1989 ch. 2, and OTA 1989)
Life on earth is protected against dangerous solar radiation by a layer of relatively
ozone rich air in the stratosphere (12-25 km above ground level). The ozone layer
hinders the passage of ultraviolet radiation to the earth's surface. Particularly the
powerful short-wave UV-B radiation is destructive to biological systems. UV-B
radiation causes or promotes skin cancer, cataracts, allergic reactions, immune
insufficiency and other diseases. It reduces the growth of plants and has adverse effects
on crop yields and possibly on entire (aquatic) food-chain systems. It even damages
some materials (plastic products) and increases smog (UNEP 1989 ch. 5).
Ozone, the three-atom form of oxygen (O3), is built up by a chemical reaction triggered
by sunlight above the tropics, from where global air circulation transports some of it to
the poles (Shea 1988:7). The delicate ozone equilibrium in the stratosphere is tipped off
by the release of anthropogenic trace gases, particularly CFCs and halons. The
characteristic ozone destroying element is chlorine in CFCs and bromine in halones.
During their long life-time, which for some compounds lasts up to 100 years, CFCs and
halons emitted into the troposphere migrate slowly to the stratosphere. There, the
compounds are broken up by powerful solar radiation and release their chlorine or
bromine parts. Each chlorine or bromine atom then catalyses the destruction of a myriad
of ozone molecules. This chain reaction depletes the ozone layer, which then lets
dangerous UV-B radiation penetrate to the earth's surface.
7-
8
2. Impact of ozone depletion across world regions
Although every part of the world is affected by ozone depletion, there appear to be
some systematic regional differences concerning the impact level and its (political)
perception and valuation. The latitudinal distribution of ozone depletion is not even.
5 Besides CFCs and halons, which were first controlled by the MP, there are some other ozone
depleting substances. Some of them were added to the list of controlled substances by the London and
Copenhagen Amendments to the MP. In most parts of the paper, CFC stands for all ozone depleting
substances.
6 CFC-11 and CFC-12 have an ozone depletion potential of 1.
7 The exact chemical process is much more complicated. For details refer to UBA (1989).
8 Apart from depleting the ozone layer, CFCs and related compounds arc very effective greenhouse
gases, which significantly contribute to global wanning.Less depletion occurs around the equator. Depletion levels are considerably higher
towards the poles with a particularly heavy loss of stratospheric ozone after the
extremely cold antarctic winter (ozone hole). Figure 1 illustrates this pattern for the
southern hemisphere.










The ozone hole over Antarctica has already started to widen over the southernmost part
of South America, New Zealand and southern Australia. In some regions in Australia
and New Zealand the current level of UV-B radiation and the "burn time" is regularly
broadcasted to warn people to protect themselves when outdoors.
9 Inhabitants of
Chile's far south arc reported to suffer from eye irritations, allergies and severe skin
burns; farmers and fishermen report that sheep, wild rabbits and salmon are going
blind.""
A similar ozone hole has not yet opened up over the North Pole. However, depressed
ozone levels and a serious increase in chlorine concentration has been detected in the
northern hemisphere, too. In the winter of 1992, scientists voiced warnings that the
exceptionally high level of chlorine in the stratosphere of the northern latitudes could,
under unfavourable weather conditions, develop an ozone hole by spring. In spring
9 "Ripa mahnt Vorreiterrolle der Gemeinschaft an", Handelsblatt, 5 March 1992. "To'dliche
Sonnenfleckcn: Die Angst vor dem Ozonloch iiber der siidlichen Erdhalfte hat den Lebensstil der
Neuseelander nachhaltig verandert", Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 19 March 1993.
10 L. Crawford, "Russian scientists to assist Chile in study of ozone layer depletion", The Financial
Times, Frankfurt and London, 18 February 1992.1993, ozone concentration over Europe was down by more than 20 per cent.
1
1 Figure 2
shows a remarkable (estimated) decline in total ozone concentration for different
northern latitudes between 1960 and 2030. Ozone erosion near the equator has not yet
been detecled. Obviously, the countries of the northern and southern high latitudes face
higher ozone depletion rales and arc therefore probably more severely affected than
countries located more closely to the equator.
1
2
Figure 2 — Loss of total ozone for different northern latitudes between 1960 and 2030
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Source: UBA (1989:23).
The impact of UV-B radiation shows a similar latitudinal bias. The biosphere in
equatorial regions is adapted to the naturally higher solar radiation levels in these
regions. Therefore, higher UV-B levels may be less damaging to the vegetation in
equatorial regions and the impact on crop yields may be less severe. Similarly, dark-
skinned people are generally less susceptible to UV-caused skin cancer than light-
skinned people. Therefore, without adaptive measures being taken, fewer lives may be
lost due to ozone depletion among the dark skinned population in countries closer to the
equator than in higher regions (UNEP 1989:37).
The valuation of UV-B-caused damage is likely to differ between regions and countries
of different level of economic development and different political systems (UNEP
11 J. Wille, "Das Ozonloch ist - noch - nicht iibcr uns", Frankfurter Rundschau, 8 February 1992. B.
James, "Ozone Hole Widens, Populated Regions Face Radiation Risk", International Herald Tribune,
5 February 1992. "Wir haben noch kein Ozonloch, aber genug Grund zur Sorge", Frankfurter
Rundschau, 23 March 1993.
12 However, ozone depletion is set off to some extent by the screening effect of air pollution in industrial
countries.1989:37f). The political valuation of diseases and lost lives is probably lower in less
developed countries (LDCs) than in developed countries (DCs). The social discount rate
in LDCs tends to be higher due to a relatively higher weight of today's needs. Global
causes for local environmental disasters are probably out of the perception of the
majority of people in LDCs. Moreover, the political system in many LDCs offers not
much opportunity for democratic participation and public pressure. Therefore, a less
pronounced reflection of peoples' needs and preferences in the political valuation and
decision making process in LDCs as compared to DCs is likely. The danger of ozone
depletion may thus be undervalued by LDCs.
The above observations indicate that there probably is an important difference in the
perceived costs of ozone depletion in LDCs as compared to DCs. This difference exists,
because the distribution of damages is biased against DCs, which are generally located
closer to the poles than the great majority of LDCs, and because richer countries have a
higher valuation of such damages. This view is supported by the observation that rich
northern and southernmost countries, particularly Canada, Norway, Finland, Australia




3. The Montreal Protocol
In the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (March 1985), which is
in force since August 1988, a great number of nations agreed on the principle objective
to "protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting from
modifications of the ozone layer".
1
4 In particular, Parties agreed to co-operate as is
relevant for reaching the purpose of the Convention. Cooperation covers research, the
formulation and implementation of measures, particularly the development of a protocol
to the Convention, and exchange of information and the development and transfer of
technologies and knowledge.
Based on the Vienna Convention and after growing scientific evidence that a serious
threat to the ozone layer and the earth exists, the Montreal Protocol (MP) was adopted
in September 1987 and came into force in January 1989. Already in June 1990, the
Member Parties met in London and agreed on adjustments and amendments to the MP.
Existing controls were tightened and more ozone depleting substances were included.
1
5
13 The noted imbalance may be set off to some extent by the global warming effect of most ozone
depleting substances, since global warming may affect LDCs more severely than most DCs. However,
recent research indicates that ozone depletion may reduce warming. Since the regional costs of global
warming are still very obscure this paper ignores them.
14 The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol with its amendments and adjustments are reprinted
in Rummel-Bulska and Osafo (1991).
15 The story of negotiating the MP is told in a remarkable way by US diplomat Richard Benedick
(1991).Apart from the principle obligations to reduce CFCs and related substances, the MP
shows two important features. First, it contains a great number of concessions for LDCs
including a grace period and financial transfers. Second, it provides for trade restrictions
against non-members. Both features are designed to induce newly industrialized
countries and LDCs to accept the MP, and to defend it against free-riding. Of some
importance for strengthening and adjusting the MP is the regular revision process
concerning controlled substances. Here, decisions by a two-third majority vote are
possible. Weakly developed are monitoring procedures. Monitoring relies entirely on
national control and self-reporting.
1
6 Non-compliance procedures were introduced at the
Copenhagen meeting in November 1992. They mainly consist of procedural rules. But
non-compliance reports shall be made available to any person upon request. And, apart
from rendering appropriate assistance, Parties may decide upon and call for steps to
bring about full compliance.
For the purpose of this paper, it is of particular interest to note how the MP treats LDCs
that operate under its Article 5.
1
7 As was pointed out above, it is likely that LDCs are
less affected by ozone depletion and hence may be less interested in an agreement on
CFC control than DCs. LDCs may therefore behave opportunistically, and in order to
win their permanent cooperation, DCs must advance the MP and entice LDCs to
participate. This is possible, in principle, by calling for sanctions against non-Parties
and non-compliant Parties and by sidepayments and other concessions (carrot and stick
approach, Somerset 1989).
3.1 Trade restrictions
Trade restrictions in the MP ban imports of CFCs and other controlled substances from
non-Parties (beginning January 1990) and exports to non-Parties (beginning January
1993). They also comprise im- and export restrictions for products that contain or are
produced with controlled substances and include technologies, products, equipment etc.
for producing controlled substances.
Newly industrialized export-oriented countries and LDCs that are unable to produce
CFCs themselves would be hit particularly hard by the MP's trade restrictions. The
Republic of Korea is an example for acceding to the Vienna Convention and the MP
only in reaction to the threat of trade restrictions.
1
8 A similar example is Taiwan, which
16 For difficulties with reporting and monitoring see Benedick (1991:179f).
17 Article-5-countries are developing countries (UN definition) with a calculated consumption of
controlled substances of less than 0.3 kilograms per capita. Only very few newly industrialized or oil
exporting countries do not fall under Article 5. For the sake of brevity, Article-5-countries are
collectively referred to as LDCs in this paper.
18 "Korea schlicBt sich Ozonschutz an", Nachrichtcn fur AuBenhandel, Eschborn, 6 March 1992.is reported to suffer an estimated loss in exports of between 100 and 200 New Taiwan $
(ca. 6.5 -13 million DM) if the trade restrictions of the MPcame into effect.
1
9
The MP does not explicitly extend those trade restrictions to Parties found in non-
compliance. However, the Copenhagen meeting of the Parties has produced an
indicative list of possible measures against countries found in non-compliance. These
measures include the suspension of specific rights and privileges under the MP, which
permits to use the trade restrictions of the MP against a defector.
2
0
3.2 Concessions concerning LDCs
The following special concessions that favour LDCs have been introduced into the MP.
- Grace period: LDCs that consume less than 0.3 kg of CFCs and halons (Annex-A-
substances) per capita enjoy a grace period of 10 years. They may delay reductions
until the year 2000, and thereafter obligations are based on the 1995-97 average
consumption level or 0.3 kg per capita if lower.
2
1
The figure of 0.3 kg may seem small compared with a per capita consumption of
0.85 kg in the USA (1984/85). It is, however, very large when measured against the
current consumption level in many LDCs (e.g., China: 0.02 kg) and when consider-
ing the large population figures of these countries. Even within the bounds of the
MP, LDCs have theoretically the potential to offset the reduction efforts of all DCs.
The MP implicitly induces LDCs to step up their production in order to reach the
highest possible base year level and to built up a stock of CFCs for recycling after
controls have become obligatory.
2
2
- Technology transfer: Parties will take every practical step to "ensure that the best
available, environmentally safe substitutes and related technologies arc expeditiously
transferred" to LDCs "under fair and most favourable conditions" (London revision).
DCs did not accept an outright obligation to transfer technologies for reasons of
intellectual property rights policy. .
- Multilateral Fund: Parties establish a financial mechanism, including a Multilateral
Fund, for the implementation of the MP in LDCs.
2
3 The Fund is financed by contri-
butions from DCs and managed by the Parties jointly.
2
4 The financial mechanism
19 "Ozonloch schafft auch in Taiwan Bewcgung", Nachrichtcn fur AuBcnhandel, Eschborn, 3 March
1992. Taiwan has not signed the MP for diplomatic reasons, but (like other countries too) Taiwan is
treated like a Parly as long as it fulfils the MP's obligations.
20 On the possible application of trade restrictions against non-Parties to Parties found in non-
compliance see also Sorensen (1988).
21 For Annex-B-substances (London amendment) the level is 0.2 kg per capita.
22 Recycling is not covered by the MP. It does not add to production neither to consumption figures and
is in fact encouraged.
23 An Interim Multilateral Fund was established as part of the London Revisions (London Revisions of
the MP, Annex IV, Appendix IV, cf. Benedick 1991:259f)- The Fund was re-affirmed and
permanently established as the Multilateral Fund by the Copenhagen meeting.
24 Some 50 per cent of the Fund's revenues is covered by contributions from only three countries:
Germany (10,66%), Japan (14,87%) and the USA (25%), sec: Forth Meeting of the Parties to the MP,shall meet all agreed incremental costs in LDCs.
2
5 For the first three years, the Fund




- Non-compliance: LDCs may notify the secretariat that, having taken all practical
steps themselves, assistance remains inadequate to fulfil the control obligations. The
Parties then consider the case and decide on appropriate remedial actions. Until a
decision, no non-compliance procedure shall be invoked on the notifying Party.
- Revision: No later than 1995, the situation of LDCs, including the effective imple-
mentation of financial and technological assistance, shall be reviewed by the Parties
and any necessary adjustments concerning the' time schedule of control measures
applicable to LDCs shall be adopted.
3.3 Compliance in the long-run
The MP has achieved nearly world-wide cooperation and has successfully imposed
strict environmental obligations in a prisoners-dilcmma-likc situation characterized by
free-riding incentives and important differences in the Parties' national interests. One
may therefore wonder how it was possible to induce so many countries (including
China and India) to sign the MP.
The prospects for sidepayments and the promise of DCs to pay the incremental costs of
LDCs may have played a role. Incremental cost funding leaves LDCs at least not worse
off than without the MP. But LDCs have a relatively strong bargaining position. Since
ozone depletion is felt more in industrial countries, LDCs could have demanded higher
sidepayments. But DCs were able to restrict payments to incremental costs. Hence, it
seems that LDCs were unable to exploit their bargaining power. The threat of trade
restrictions may have helped to limit payments to LDCs. Another explanation may be
found in the concessions, especially the ten-year grace period, which render the
implementation of the MP in LDCs more flexible.
The particular design of the MP gives rise to questioning its long-run stability. It is not
clear whether all Parties will adhere to the MP or whether a breach is likely to occur in
the future. Permanent compliance with the MP by an opportunistic country can only be
expected if, for each and all future periods, the discounted gains from compliance
exceed those from breaching the MP. Compliance by LDCs is likely as long as the
grace period is in effect (until the year 2000), since for that period control obligations
are weak and do not seriously conflict with growth expectations in LDCs. In this period
Draft Decisions, Annex XIV, Nov.92, UNEP/O/L.Pro.4/L.l/Rcv.2. The Fund operates as part of the
Global Environmental Facilities (GEF) at the World Bank, but under a separate status.
25 Incremental costs are those costs of a project that exceed the costs that a country would bear in its one
interest.
26 India, for instance, has claimed substantial compensation when joining. See, "Wider die Oko-Kolo-
nialistcn: Wie man in Indien iiber den Erd-Gipfcl denkt", Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 February 1992.10
incremental costs will be relatively low such that large transfers by DCs to LDCs are
not required.
This, however, may be different after the year 2000 when DCs will irreversibly have
stopped their CFC consumption and phasing-out in LDCs, who may have stepped up
CFC production by that time, is to begin. Reciprocity in CFC reductions, which is
already weak due to the smaller ozone depletion and radiation effect in most LDCs, can
no longer be employed to strengthen compliance. Moreover, rising incremental costs
may be difficult to cover by the Multilateral Fund and disputes between Parties over
funding may arise.
2
7 In this situation, LDCs may have an incentive to disregard the MP.
They may simply fail to fulfil their reduction obligations, tacitly or openly. Moreover, it
is conceivable that, with a worsening of the ozone and radiation situation in DCs, LDCs
discover their bargaining power and, in return for compliance, demand transfer
payments from DCs substantially higher than incremental costs.
2
8
It therefore seems that the concessions to LDCs have burdened the MP with a serious
time inconsistency. Moreover, the gains from saving the ozone layer seem to be
unevenly distributed between DCs and LDCs,,which may be unsustainable in the long-
run. These observations cast some doubt on the eventual stability and effectiveness of
the MP. Whether trade sanctions will be used in cases of non-compliance and whether
this would be sufficient to guarantee long-run compliance, particularly by countries
with a large internal market, remains an open question.
2
9
The remainder of this paper is a stylized analysis of the MP. The analysis treats non-
Parties and non-compliant Parties alike. It assumes that the ozone game is played by
two homogeneous groups of countries, namely DCs who advance the MP and
opportunistic LDCs. The following Sections investigate some features of the MP in a
formal framework. Section 4 analyses the MP as a one-shot game with two players. It
shows that the threat of sanctions is unsuitable for achieving agreement and compliance.
The Section compares the outcome of the non-cooperative ozone game with the solution
of a hypothetical cooperative Nash bargaining game of identical structure. Section 5
extends the analysis to a game with many LDC-players which face a coalition of DCs
individually. This Section studies the willingness of LDCs to accede to and comply with
the MP in a multi-player setting when non-Parties and defecting Parties face the threat
of trade sanctions. Section 6 models the MP as a two-period ozone game with two
players. It derives strict conditionality between transfer payments and irreversible CFC
reductions as an important condition for the stability of the MP. Section 7 concludes the
paper by discussing whether the MP can be expected to be stable in the long-run.
27 Already during the Copenhagen meeting, LDCs criticized DCs for hesitating to make agreed upon
fun.ds available to the Multilateral Fund (UNEP/OzL.Pro4/L.2, 24 Nov. 92). See also "Sehr hohe
Bcitragsriickstande: Sieben EG-Slaatcn schuldcn Ozonschicht-Fond Geld", Nachrichten fur
AuBenhandcl, Eschborn, 16 December 1992.
28 In this context, it is interesting to note that the Multilateral Fund was only established at the London
Meeting of the Parties upon pressure from LDCs who were already members of the MP. See
Markandya (1991:7).
29 On the question of compliance see also Enders and Porges (1992).11
4. The two-players one-shot ozone game
We assume that binding commitments are not possible in the ozone game described in
Sections 4.1, 5 and 6. Hence, we apply non-cooperative game theory and the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium as the relevant solution concept. The leading question in these
Sections is under which conditions cooperation will emerge and will be stable. If the
stabilization of cooperation proofs feasible, it seems possible that the non-cooperative
ozone game mutates into a cooperative game, in which the relevant issue is how to
divide the gains from cooperation between the partners. This question will briefly be
dealt with in Sections 4.2 by applying the cooperative Nash bargaining concept.
The following model is simplistic. It assumes that the direct gains form CFC reductions
(U) can only be realized in full cooperation between DCs (player A) and LDCs (player
B). The notion behind this assumption is that, in the long-run, the ozone layer will
definitely be destroyed by either group's emissions, since either group is individually
capable of pushing the accumulated quantity of ozone depleting substances in the
atmosphere beyond the relevant threshold. Moreover, the model assumes that all direct
gains from cooperation accrue only to DCs (U=UA), which reflects the smaller damage
in LDCs and allows us to isolate the effect of sidepayments and sanctions and study it
more conveniently. The model is completed by the costs of reducing CFCs for both
players (CA, Cg), by sidepayments T to LDCs, and by A's costs of imposing sanctions
and their impact on B (Sg).
4.1 Conditions of cooperation
The above described scenario is captured by the game Ozone I. The payoff matrix in
Table 2 shows the gains from stopping CFC emissions and the relevant costs for both
















The payoffs in Ozone I are calibrated against the status-quo situation (no MP) in which
each player maximizes his/her own utility function without respect to the other player's
utility. Hence, phase-out costs CA and Cg arc incremental costs in the language of the
MP. In the non-cooperative outcome (emit; emit) both players have utility zero. If both
players A and B choose phase-out, they have to face costs CA or Cg respectively, and12
player A gains utility UA O^A^A)
 wnerea
s B gains nothing but is left with her costs
CB-
3
0 Hence, cooperation is not a feasible solution. To continue emissions is always the
dominant strategy for B, even if A could commit himself to play phase-out. Since the
strategy combination (phase-out; emit) would leave A with a real loss, A plays emit as
well. The outcome of Ozone I is the non-cooperative (emit; emit).
The cooperative solution can only be reached if player A is able and willing to alter the
payoff matrix. He can do this by raising the costs of continued emissions for B through
imposing sanctions with impact SB on B and costs SA for himself, and/or by making
side-payments T to B to give B a positive payoff from cooperation. The adjusted payoff
matrix (Ozone II) is given in Table 3.





(UA-CA-T ; T-CB) (-CA-SA ; -SB) (0 ; -CB) (0 ; 0)
Ozone II assumes that sanctions will only be imposed if A phases out and B emits and
that transfers are only paid if both players phase out. Depending on the severity of
sanctions and/or on the amount of transfers, Ozone II may have a cooperative outcome.




B: T-CB ^ -SB (2)
Inequality (2) is the participation condition for B, who will only cooperate if the impact
of sanctions SB is not more costly than her costs of phasing out minus received
transfers. Since sanctions will only be imposed by A if A plays phase-out, B's decision
is subject to A's rationality constraint (1), namely that A's total gains are not negative.
If A could commit himself to impose sanctions on B despite his potential loss, Ozone II
would have two Nash equilibria: (phase-out; phase-out) and (emit; emit). But being
sovereign, A cannot credibly commit himself to punish B, because executing sanctions
would hurt A more than simply playing emit as well. The threat of sanctions is therefore
not credible. Since both players know that sanctions are an ineffective threat, the non-
cooperative outcome (emit; emit) remains the only Nash equilibrium. A different
outcome is only possible if (2) is replaced by (3).
30 To assume a cooperative utility gain Ug for B, too, would not alter the results qualitatively as long as
UB<CB.
31 We assume thai players behave sympathetically, i.e. if a player is indifferent between two alternatives,
he chooses the cooperative alternative.Bibiiofhefe
Instituts fur Weltwirtschd
B: T-CB;>0 or T&CB (3)
In this case in which A pays at least B's costs, B's payoff from cooperation is non-
negative and the cooperative Nash equilibrium is at least as good for both players as the
non-cooperative one. Hence, A can safely play phase-out, since (3) ensures that B will
play phase-out, too. Condition (3) reflects the fact that in Ozone II sanctions are not
credible and thus have no effect.
3
2 Therefore, to achieve cooperation, A must adopt a
transfer scheme that satisfies (3) and (1). Hence, only for those transfers for which U^-
holds the cooperative Nash equilibrium results.
We summarize the result of this Section as follows: In a one-shot ozone game with two
sovereign players, sanctions are not credible and ineffective. The transfers necessary to
lure a coalition of opportunistic countries into cooperation are independent of
announcing sanctions to be imposed in case of non-cooperation. Transfers must in any
case be selected in such a way that both players gain a non-negative payoff from
cooperation.
4.2 The cooperative Nash bargaining solution
The above result describes the lower bound for transfers that guarantee a cooperative
solution. This lower bound is, however, not necessarily the outcome of a bargaining
game between A and B over the amount of transfers that are acceptable for both players
in a situation of cooperation. If cooperation can be made certain by paying transfers,
cooperative bargaining theory may become the relevant solution concept for predicting
the distribution of the total gains from cooperation.
Strategic bargaining between A and B over sharing net gains can be modelled by
Rubinstein's (1982) strategic bargaining approach of alternating offers over infinite
time, in which players' shares depend on the difference in their time preferences (or
other bargaining costs). If players' time preferences are equal, Rubinstein's model yields
a symmetric equal split outcome (safe of a small first mover advantage). An equal split
outcome can also be reproduced by the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution, which we
will employ here as a benchmark solution. The simple Nash bargaining solution
distributes the gains from cooperation minus the conflict payoffs to both players in
equal shares.
3
3 Formally, the Nash bargaining solution is a jpint maximization problem
of the form (u-^ -c^)(u2 -C2) = max (uj-c-^^-c^, in which Uj is the utility of
32 Sanctions may, however, have an effect in a repeated game with alternating moves. See Eaton and
Engers (1992).
33 The Nash bargaining solution applied here assumes that the bargaining power of both players is equal.
Asymmetries in preferences, disagreement points, the bargaining procedure and in players' beliefs
about their environment can be captured in the construction of the relevant threat points. Asymmetries
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cooperation and Cj the utility of non-cooperation (conflict payoff) for both players i=l,2
and Ziij is constant.
In our case, Cj=O for A and B, since sanctions are not a credible threat against B and
therefore the non-cooperative strategy combination (emit; emit) yields 0 for both
players. Maximizing (4) with respect to T produces the Nash-transfers T in (5).
max: (UA-CA-T)(T-CB) (4)
T
T* = 1/2(UA-CA+CB) = CB + 1/2[UA-(CA+CB)] (5)
The result (5) shows that A pays B's costs of phasing out CFCs and transfers half of his
total net gains from saving the ozone layer to B, thus sharing the net gains from
cooperation equally between both players.
4.3 Plausibility of the Nash bargaining result
The above Nash bargaining result seems to contradict the limitation of transfers in the
MP to incremental costs (CB), which, in our model world of Ozone II, gives LDCs no
profit from cooperation. Nevertheless, many LDCs have signed the MP and have agreed
to its adjustments and amendments. If the assumption that LDCs have considerable
bargaining power in the ozone game is correct, there must be other reasons for this
outcome. These reasons may include: (a) The direct gains from cooperation in DCs
(UA) may be very small, (b) There may be large gains from reducing CFCs cooper-
atively in LDCs as well (UB>0). (c) There may be tacit sidepayments. (d) The result
that sanctions are irrelevant may not apply, (c) The approach of a one-shot game with
two players may be too coarse to describe the problem adequately. The following
paragraphs examine those reasons.
It seems that prospective gains from cooperation can become very large. Several
countries have conducted extensive studies on the costs and benefits of phasing out
CFCs. Such studies are subject to great ecological and economic uncertainties. In
particular, the valuation of health effects and the applied social discount rate heavily
affect the results (UNEP 1989 ch. 5.4). Nevertheless, they are intuitive with respect to
the magnitude of net benefits. A US EPA (1988) study suggests that, under a wide range
of alternative assumptions, the benefits of phasing out CFCs world-wide outweigh the
possible costs by far. A typical example is given in Table 4. A similar result is presented
by Smith and Vodden (1989), who assess the costs and benefits of the MP for Canada
(Table 5). The reported total gains are impressive. However, the data do not permit to
derive the value of cooperation between DCs and LDCs, which is the incremental
benefit of adding LDCs to the ozone coalition.15
Table 4 — Costs and benefits of CFC reductions through 2075 by scenario, United





CFC 20% Cut 3396
CFC 50% Cut 3488














(a) See Regulatory Impact Analysis (US EPA 1988) for assumptions and definitions of scenarios. Estimates
assume a 2 percent discount rate and S3 million per unit mortality risk reduction. All dollar values in the Table
reflect the difference between the No Controls scenario and the specified alternative scenario. Valuation of health
and environmental benefits applies only to people born before 2075; costs are estimated through 2075. (b)
Changes in net incremental benefits represent movement to the indicated scenario from the scenario listed above
it.
Source: US EPA (1988) Segment of Exhibits 10-9. Here reproduced from UNEP (1989:41).
Table 5 — Net present value of implementing the Montreal Protocol under various




















High social discount rate 00
Low value of life (
c)
Low social discount, low value of life (
d)
Low value of life, slow industry response (
e)
Source: Smith and Vodden (1989:420).
Barrett (1989, 1991) suggests that the benefits of cooperation between all countries are
relatively small. He argues that the signatories have not obliged themselves to much
more reduction than is in their individual interest, i.e. U^ is small. Hence, according to
Barrett^the MP was easy to sign. This assessment appears to hold even more in the case
of cooperation between the coalitions of DCs and LDCs, since LDCs presently have a
small share of world-wide production capacity for and consumption of ozone depleting
substances. However, what is relevant for our analysis is the potential future production
capacity of LDCs under conditions of economic development unimpeded by any ozone
treaty. Lack of technology is no hurdle. CFCs are relatively easy to produce (Benedick,
1991:4). The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1989:295) estimates that the
consumption of CFC-11 and -12 in LDCs could, by 2009, reach the 1986 level of 66016
metric tonnes in DCs.
3
4 Mintzer (1989:20) estimates that, if only China, India,
Indonesia, and Brazil increased their domestic consumption of CFCs to the level of 0.3
kilograms per capita by 1995, which would be covered by the MP, global production
and use of controlled substances would approximately double from the 1986 level.
Hence, the impression that cooperation with LDCs is needed, since the gains from
cooperation (U^) can become large in the future relative to a situation without any
ozone treaty seems justified.
Another question is whether there will be gains from cooperation other than sidepay-
ments in LDCs as well, i.e. Ug>0. We have argued above that the damage in LDCs
caused by ozone depletion is smaller than in DCs and that large benefits for LDCs
would not exist or would not be reflected in the political process. Gains from
cooperation may nevertheless exist in LDCs. But for the magnitude of sidepayments,
the clifference between the perceived utilities U^ and Ug counts. If this difference is
large, high Nash-transfers are a necessary result of the cooperative Nash bargaining
game. Unfortunately, we have no data to prove that the difference is large. The
ecological uncertainty of ozone depletion is substantial, which may in fact have led
many LDCs to cooperate without demanding more than coverage of incremental costs.
The Parties may also have linked the ozone treaty to other issues of international
relations. This raises the complexity of the game and allows for sidepayments that can
pass undiscovered by the public. Such out-of-treaty sidepayments are often non-
monetary, which is an important advantage in diplomatic negotiations and international
relations. They may even come as tacit agreements on completely different issues.
3
5
However, the larger the number of participants in a multilateral treaty is the less likely
are out-of-treaty sidepayments between the parties. A reason for this is that an equal and
clearly observable treatment oFall parties to a treaty is an important prerequisite for
broad agreement. In the ozone case, LDCs may hope for more development aid or may
believe that the technology transfers agreed in the MP will break the way to additional
export earnings and beneficial cooperation in other fields. However, these motivations
must remain largely speculative^ It seems that the available information on benefits and
tacit sidepayments does not provide a clue for a different result.
According to Section 4.1, transfer payments are independent of the threat of sanctions.
However, intuition and evidence do not support this result.
3
6 Hence, we may wonder
whether the Ozone II game is correctly specified. Ozone II is a one-shot game with two
34 OTA's estimates seem particularly plausible with a view to the huge need for refrigeration in most of
these countries. According to press reports, new CFC production facilities are presently under con-
struction in China and India. See "Ozonkiller FCKW noch bis Ende 1994", Suddeutsche Zeitung,
15/16 February 1992. Compare also "Wider die Oko-Kolonialisten: Wie man in Indien fiber den Erd-
Gipfel denkt", Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 February 1992, and Simonis and von Weizsacker
(1990:4,6).
35 Examples are the International Columbia River Treaty between Canada and the U.S. (Krutilla, 1966)
and the Colorado River Treaty between Mexico and the U.S.
36 Compare the behaviour of some NICs (Korea, Taiwan) reported above (Section 3.1).17
players. It reflects a bilateral monopoly with DCs who demand ozone protection on the
one side and LDCs who supply this service against payment on the other side. A bilat-
eral monopoly model is, however, unlikely to reflect the reality of the ozone world
correctly. It is perhaps justified to treat DCs as a cartel for issues that affect them jointly
vis a vis LDCs. But it is probably misleading to assume that LDCs act as a cartel, too.
Instead, it is more plausible that they face the block of DCs one by one. Hence, the
situation could rather be characterized as a monopsony. In a monopsony situation, the
bargaining power of LDCs is much reduced. They may be more susceptible to pressure
and to the threat of sanctions, because isolation, i.e. non-existence of a LDC-coalition,
enhances the impact of sanctions on the isolated country and reduces the cost of
imposing sanctions. Section 5 will investigate this approach in more detail.
Another complication lies in the fact that the ozone game is not a one-shot game as we
have assumed above. As a one-shot game, Ozone II describes a long-run result and not
a development. Contrary to the ineffectiveness of sanctions noted above, the trade
restrictions in the MP may have a short-run effect. DCs are probably not capable of
building up their own CFC production rapidly. Therefore, CFC trade restrictions may,
at least temporarily, reduce LDCs' consumption of CFCs. Since reduced CFC
consumption in LDCs benefits the ozone layer and thereby DCs, trade restrictions may
not necessarily imply net costs for DCs. Hence, the trade restrictions in the MP may be
a credible threat initially. In the long-run, however, their stabilizing effect may wear out
with the installation of CFC production capacities in LDCs to supply the domestic
market. But these capacities can also be used strategically as pressure instrument in
future negotiations over the MP and DCs' sidepayments.
3
7 Already the ozone game as
we observe it in the Vienna Convention and the MP is a repeated game with quite a
number of provisions for renegotiations. But the strategy set of players is even larger. It
comprises numerous out-of-treaty options in the course of time from hidden violations
to an open breach of the ozone treaty. We deal with these strategic options in Section 6.
5. The multi-players one-shot ozone game
In this Section, we model an ozone game in which a cartel of DCs (player A) faces each
LDC (player b) individually. Player A is determined to ensure full cooperation at
minimum costs. A's strategic parameters are transfers T and sanctions S(F), with F
denoting the intensity of sanctions.
37 Compare, e.g., "Die Ozon-Lochcr kommen bald aus Indien", Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 February
1993.18
5.1 The model
Player A must be prepared to deal with a group of non-cooperative players, B", and a
group of cooperative players, B
+, which together form the group B. The absolute size of
each group A, B, B', B




8 k denotes the degree of cooperation: k = Yg
+/Yg (0 s k s 1) measures the
relative size of B
+, (1-k) = YgVYg measures the relative size of B".
3
9 B consists of
arbitrarily many identical members bj of size Y^j (2Yjjj=Yg). Player b of size Y^ is
one representative, arbitrarily small member of B. b plays the game against A and
decides whether to cooperate or not.
4
0 Table 6 shows the payoffs in the game Ozone III.







+) (kUA-CA-kT-SA+ ; -sb")
(0 ; -cbYb) (0 ; 0)
A's phase-out payoff function is kU^-C^-kT-S^* no matter whether b plays cooper-
atively or not. It reflects A's costs of possible sanctions (S^
+) against the non-
cooperative players in B'. Moreover, the existence of B"-players leads to a decline in
A's utility from cooperation, hence kU^, but it also reduces A's transfer bill, hence kT
instead of T under full cooperation (k=l). A's strategy and payoff function is
independent of the particular strategy of any particular bj, but it depends on the number
of cooperative versus non-cooperative members in B, i.e. on k.
Player b's cooperative payoff is (t[3-C|3)Y(:)-S[3
+, her non-cooperative payoff is -s^".
4
1 If b
plays cooperatively, she faces costs c^ (=Cg/Yg) and receives transfers t^ (=T/Yg)
both weighted with b's size Y^. But in addition, b must take into account that she has to
share the costs of sanctions against (possible) B'-members (Sb
+) if she signs the phase-
out treaty. If b does not sign, she must face the impact of sanctions imposed on herself
Hence, there are two conditions for a stable cooperative solution. A's payoff must be
positive (6) and b's payoff from cooperation must be larger or equal to his payoff from
non-cooperation (7). If only one of both conditions is not met, cooperation is
impossible.
38 We use GDP as a proxy for a country's reliance on CFCs. Compare Section 1.
39 For a different approach that involves fixing a minimum participation level k in order to build large
cooperating coalitions and counter free riding sec Black, Levi and de Mcza (1990).
40 The assumption that all players in B arc identical entails that b's participation decision coincides with
the participation decision of all other players in B. The assumption is relaxed later.
41 Player b's payoff may be supplemented by a utility gain if A plus a number of b-players phase out.






We complete the model by specifying the costs and the impact of sanction for each type
of player. The specification is simplified, but it captures the basic notion we pursue in
this paper.
A: SA
+ = FY(l-k)YA (8)
b
+: sb
+ =Fa(l-k)Yb for k>0 (9)
= 0 for k=0
b": sb" = F[6+|3(k-Yb/YB)]Yb for k>0 (10)
for k=0
(8) - (10) reflect that the cost and impact of sanctions for all types of players depend on
the intensity of sanctions T, on the share of cooperative versus non-cooperative fa-
players k, on the players' size YA and Yb and on the cost or impact parameters
characteristic for each type of player, y and a measure the basic costs for A and for the
cooperative b
+-player of imposing sanctions, and 6 and (3 measure the basic impact of
A's and b
+ls sanctions on the non-cooperative b'-player. (0 <, F, Y, ct, 6+p s 1)
The costs of sanctions SA
+ and sb
+ are zero in the case of full cooperation (k=l). They
increase with falling cooperation (k->0) up to a maximum that depends on F and on y or
a respectively. sb
+ jumps to zero again in the case of zero cooperation (k=0), since in
this case B
+ is an empty set. The impact of sanctions sb' is F6Yb in the case of zero
cooperation (k=0), since this share of the burden can be inflicted on b" by A alone. In
the case of partial cooperation (k>0), b" suffers an additional impact that the
cooperative b
+-players inflict on her. But k decreases when b defects. Therefore, in
comparing cooperation to defection in (7), the relevant degree of cooperation for
specifying sb" in (10) is k'=(Yg
+-Yb)/Yg=k-Yb/Yg. When full cooperation is reached
(k=l), sanctions imposed on a defecting marginal b-player (Yb->0) have maximum
impact. (See Figure 3 for sb
+ and sb'.)
5.2 Minimum participation
For both players A and b, the value of k is critical in choosing a strategy: Cooperation
must be large enough to render the proposed scheme profitable for A and to induce b to
participate in it. We deal with b's participation constraint first. Inserting (9) and (10)
into (7) yields (11) which we solve for k to derive the critical value kb (12).
b: (tb-cb)Yb-ra(l-k)Yb+r[6+P(k-Yb/YB)]Yb * 0 (11)20
<b =





kb is the minimum level of participation for any player b. Effective participation at or
beyond kb guarantees that b cooperates. The last term of (12) reflects the fact that
defection reduces cooperation and thus the impact of sanctions on the defector. kb
increases in player's size, but the term's influence is normally very small and disappears
for marginal b-players (Yb->0). If we assume that A has fixed his transfers to
incremental costs (tb=cb), then (12) simplifies further to kb =(a-S)/(cc+P) and the
minimum participation level depends solely on b's cost and impact parameters, since the
intensity of sanctions F cancels out. Hence, in this case, the intensity of sanctions does
not influence b's decision. If A is able to threaten b with credible sanctions such that
6&a, then kb is set to zero and b always cooperates. But if 5<a, it is only rational for b
to cooperate if a sufficiently large number of b-players does likewise so that at least kb
is reached (Figure 3). If incremental costs are not covered by A, it is obvious from (12)
that reducing transfers below incremental costs increases the minimum participation
level and vice versa. Moreover, in this case, the intensity of sanctions comes into play in
that the less severe sanctions are (F small) the more kb increases (for tb<cb) or
decreases (for tb>cb).









\ ^^-^.\ , k
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Successful cooperation between A and b requires that A's rationality condition (6)
holds, too, because otherwise A's threat of sanctions against outsiders is not credible.
Inserting (8) into (6) and solving for k yields A's minimum participation level k^ .21
uA-T+rYYA
FyYA reflects the influence of the costs of sanctions on kA . If sanctions are not used
(F=0) or are costless for A (Y=0), then kA depends solely on UA and on the associated
costs CA and T. kA is necessarily larger than zero, even without costs of sanctions,
since only a minimum level of cooperation gives A sufficient utility (kUA) to cover his
costs CA and the associated transfers kT. With increasing costs of sanctions, kA
increases quickly, surpasses k^ , and becomes the overall binding participation
constraint.
To convince b that A will stick to his sanction scheme when minimum cooperation at
kjj is realized requires kA ^k^ . Hence, (14) must hold. (To keep things simple we
assume incremental cost transfers, c^t^ or Cg=T, and a marginal b-player, Yb->0.)
Solving (14) for F yields the maximum intensity of sanctions (F ) that A can impose
without overriding b's minimum participation level k^ .
a-6 *
a(UA-CA-CB)-pCA-6(UA-CB)
A numerical example illustrates that F must indeed be small to satisfy (14): a=0.05,
(3=0.1, y=0.05, 6=0.02, UA=100, CA=10, CB=10, YA=100000 produces kA*=kb*=0.2
and F*<;0.002.
Above we have established minimum conditions for cooperation which, if satisfied,
guarantee that cooperation between A and b-players is stable. Furthermore, assuming
that all players in B are identical, partial cooperation at or beyond the minimum
participation level k^ (^kA ) immediately leads to full cooperation (k=l). In the event
of full cooperation, sanctions are not executed, but they remain a credible and effective
threat against isolated players who consider reneging. Cooperation, once achieved and
then supported by sanctions, is self-enforcing if coalition-forming by players who are
inclined to renege is unlikely or can be prevented, since for an isolated marginal b-
player it is better to participate in punishing a defector instead of suffering sanctions
herself. Additionally, the threat of sanctions against non-cooperative or reneging players
can be reinforced by raising the intensity of sanctions after cooperation has emerged
and by creating suitable institutions.
4
2
42 For instance, sidepayments can be paid into a fund that is shared out to the intended recipients in the
following period. If a party violates the treaty, it forfeits its share, which can then be used to com-
pensate complying parties for their cost of imposing sanctions on the violator.22
5.3 Cooperation and transfers
We have not yet addressed the question why cooperation should emerge at all and how
A can promote its start. An isolated player bj has no reason to believe a priori that
cooperation will emerge and reach a level at or beyond the critical values k^ and
k^ .
4
3 Hence, the threat of sanctions by other b-players and by A may not be credible.
This impasse is not easy to break, particularly in the framework of a one-shot game and
under the assumption that all b-players are identical. Promoting cooperation and
reducing transfers are competing aims. More interesting in terms of A's strategy and
perhaps more realistic is the case of a dynamic game with non-identical players in B
with which A negotiates individually and in sequence. In this case, underpaying
incremental costs and inducing cooperation is theoretically feasible. In the following
paragraphs, we discuss some conceivable strategies under both assumptions.
First, there may be certain a priory beliefs about other players intentions. Some player
b: may have a distinct expectation k^
e concerning the emerging level of cooperation.
4
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In a world of uncertainty and imperfect information, A may be able to promote such
expectations to start cooperation and b: may have to rely on them for choosing her
strategy.
4
5 If b:'s expectations for cooperation exceed k^ (k^j^kj, ), she will
cooperate — and so will every other identical player bj so that the level of cooperation
will immediately jump to full cooperation (k=l). In this case, expectations are a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Obviously, A can exploit possible high expectations for
cooperation. If k^
e is much larger than k^ , A can reduce his transfers somewhat below
incremental costs in a trade-off for a higher k^ .
Sequential negotiations with non-identical players in B allow A to exploit possible
differences in expectations (k^j^k^:
6) or minimum participation levels (k^j ^k^.- ) for
reducing the transfer bill and/or promoting cooperation.
4
6 If players in B are different, A
can select his negotiation partners strategically. He can first deal with those players b:
who have a high willingness to sign an agreement, because their expectation for
cooperation k^f is higher and/or their minimum participation level k^.- is lower than
those of bj, since, for instance, b: may be more susceptible to sanctions. If the number
43 In international legal practice, the risk for each Party that signs an agreement as to whether a
minimum participation level will be reached is contained by making the agreement's coming into
force conditional on a certain minimum number of ratifications. Contractual obligations to sanction
non-Parties is additional justification for this practice. The MP requires the deposition of at least 11
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession representing at least two-thirds of 1986
estimated global consumption of the controlled substances.
44 Distinct expectations are possible, if bj does not know that all b-players are identical as we assume
here.
45 A different approach would be to specify bj's willingness to cooperate as a random variable that
would be updated upon observing ku* and the behaviour of all other members in B. A low k^* would
raise the level of cooperation and trie probability of full cooperation, but full cooperation need not
emerge instantaneously. On the contrary, if cooperation remains below k^* in a first round, the
individual willingness to cooperate may collapse, which makes it much more difficult to reach an
agreement in a second round.
46 Differences in minimum participation levels arc possible if players in B differ with respect to the
relevant parameters (cb, a, p, 6) or in si7X (Yb). Compare (12) above.23
of b:-players is large enough so that their signing the agreement lifts cooperation above
the minimum participation level k^j of the yet abstaining players bj, the latter will
follow suit. If b:'s cooperation lowers the participation expectation of the abstaining bj-
players, it will be easier and less costly for A to induce the latter to sign the agreement
in a second or third round of negotiations.
Second, with identical players, A can try to reduce k^ (and k^ ) as much as possible
(to zero or below k^
e) to induce the start of cooperation. As can be seen from (12), A
can reduce k^ by selecting a sanction scheme with large parameters 6 and p. If 6aa,
kjj is set to zero (under incremental cost transfers). Alternatively, A may reduce k^ by
overpaying incremental costs, possibly coupled with a weak intensity of sanctions (T
small). But increasing transfers raises k^ , which, as can be seen from (13), cannot be
reduced below a minimum level larger zero by weakening the intensity of sanctions
(T->Q) or by introducing an appropriate institutional commitment to pay transfers
and/or impose sanctions. Hence, A's strategy to drive down k^ may not be credible in
the eyes of a b-player, whose participation expectation is too low. Even sanctions that
benefit A and which can reduce k^ to zero may not allow to reduce transfers, since
reducing transfers always increases k^ .
In the case of sequential negotiations with non-identical players, A may use his transfer
payments strategically to reduce the minimum participation requirement k^: of those
players b: who move first. By promising early movers payments above incremental
costs (tkj>%j), A can induce them to cooperate. This either raises participation
immediately above the minimum participation level or it reduces the participation
expectation of yet abstaining players or both. In both cases, abstaining players become
increasingly willing to cooperate. A can than gradually lower his transfer offer to late-
comers — even below their incremental costs. Thus, the strategy of sequential negoti-
ations can lead to competition between players in B for being served first.
4
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A third option for promoting cooperation is available to A if A happens to earn a benefit
from imposing sanctions on b-players (Y<0, in contrast to our previous assumption). In
this case, A can reduce k^ as described above and relax his own participation
constraint k^ simultaneously, so that his strategy including the sanction scheme
becomes a credible threat for b-players, for whom cooperation is then imperative. Under
such particular conditions, sanctions can be an instrument to start cooperation and
sustain it after the agreement has come into force.
It seems that this third option was used by DCs for designing the MP and promoting
cooperation. First, at least initially, the impact of DCs
1 CFC-trade restrictions on CFC
importing LDCs (6) is probably severe whereas the costs of participating in such trade
47 Whether A can use this strategy to reduce his total transfer payments T below overall incremental
costs Cg must be left open to question. It also needs to be investigated how the strategy of sequential
negotiations is affected by A's rationality constraint.24
restrictions against outsiders (a) is probably very small for most LDCs. Hence, a-5 is
presumably smaller than zero and, under incremental cost transfers, we can set k^ to
zero. Second, sanctions in the form of trade restrictions on CFCs are likely to reduce
world wide CFC consumption and emissions at least temporarily, which benefits the
ozone layer and thereby DCs. Additionally, selling substitutes to LDCs may be more
profitable than selling ordinary CFCs.48 Hence, with beneficial trade restrictions, k^
may well be zero, which renders A's threat of trade restrictions credible. Therefore,
signing the MP may have been the dominant strategy for most LDCs whereas
complying with its terms later on may be a different matter.
We summarize above result as follows. The role of sanctions in international environ-
mental agreements is ambiguous. A sanction scheme is a powerful tool for stabilizing
existing international cooperation if parties do not collude in breaching the agreement.
But proposing a sanction scheme against outsiders and defectors before cooperation has
started can make the initiation of cooperation much more difficult. Special cases that
facilitate the start of cooperation are: high a priori expectations for the emergence of
cooperation, positive returns from sanctions and the dynamics of sequential negotiations
with non-identical players. In these cases, which may have played a role in designing
the MP, sanctions can be compatible with initiating cooperation. But in any case,
chances to reduce transfer payments below incremental costs seem to be very limited.
6. The Montreal Protocol as a game in two periods
Repeated^games are different as compared to one-shot games in that the time dimension
opens the possibility to retaliate for a non-cooperative move. Above, we have analysed
a situation in which the state of the world was fixed after the signing of the treaty.
Renegotiations were excluded and the treaty had to be kept no matter what. However, in
analysing the role of sanctions, we have already pointed to their contract stabilizing
effect. In this Section we introduce a distinct time structure and investigate the
strategies that players then have. We use the bilateral situation of player A against
player B as in Section 4 and make the same assumptions concerning payoffs and costs.
But we assume a time path as in Figure 4 and model the game as a two-period game,
period 1 (-^t) from year 1-10 and period 2 (2O starting with year 11. In period jt the
agreement is signed, A phases out CFCs and makes transfers to B. In period ^ B phases
out or breaches the agreement. This pattern is motivated by the MP; it reflects the grace
period for LDCs.
48 However, this effect is probably only temporary, since suppliers in LDCs may take over. But the
transitional period may have been enough to induce LDCs to at least sign the MP.25







Start of the game. A and B sign the agreement.
A starts with phasing-out at costs C^.
- A transfers T (=CB) to B.
A has completed his phase-out operation.
B must start with phasing-out at costs Cg.
B decides to honour or breach the agreement.
Game ends.
The payoffs for A and B in each single period are given in Table 7. If A and B sign the
agreement in period -^t, player A invests in CFC substitutes and in transfers to B. If B
does not sign the agreement in ]l, A can invest in substitutes and impose sanctions on B
or he can continue emissions. In period ^, A harvests the gains from phasing out CFCs
if B complies, or he continues sanctions against B.
4
9



























In both periods, considered separately, cooperation is impossible. This is obvious in ^t;
in 2* the threat of sanctions is not credible, since A cannot commit himself to sanctions
that would make him worse off than continuing emissions. However, in non-
cooperative repeated games, players are confronted in each period with a payoff matrix
that reflects not only their current but also their expected future payoffs. But they do not
take past payoffs into account, which are sunk costs or bygone profits. Since the players'
strategies in 2
1 are anticipated by both players when entering the game in it, their
strategy set is larger in the two-period game. It combines the possible actions for both
players in both periods. This yields a new game that can be represented by a four-by-
four matrix that shows the payoffs for each two-period strategy combination.
49 Possible phasing-out costs for A in 2^ have been neglected here for simplicity.26

































In Table 8, we have omitted the strategy combinations (e/po; •/•) and (•/•; e/po), since
we are mainly interested in those combinations in which both players agree to cooperate
in |t and choose their actions freely in 2
1-
50 However, we have added the combination
(c/c; e/e) as the ultimate conflict situation.
The question is, whether the fully cooperative strategy combination (po/po; po/po) can
be reached. Ozone V has the two trivial Nash equilibria (e/c; po/e) and (e/e; c/e).
Additionally, the cooperative outcome (po/po; po/po) is a Nash equilibrium if the
strategy po/po yields a bigger pay-off for each player than each player's second best














But the cooperative outcome mayliot be subgame perfect yet. Although (16) may hold,
(17) is not a sufficient condition for cooperation, since sanctions 2Sg are not credible:
If B signs in -j^t and breaches the agreement in ^ i-
e- B plays po/e, A is caught in a very
bad situation, since then he has not only borne his costs of total phase-out but has also
paid transfers to B in |t without getting any return from doing so in ^. Hence, B can be
sure that A will play po/e to minimize his loss by avoiding the cost 2SA of sanctioning
B. However, since A will anticipate B's defection, he will select e/e right in the
beginning, which means that the treaty will never be signed. Hence, full cooperation is
not a subgame perfect equilibrium and the combinations (e/e; po/e) and (e/e; e/e) are the
only feasible outcomes of Ozone V.
Taking the non-credibility of sanctions in ^
 mt
0 account, cooperation in Ozone V is
only sustainable if holding on to the agreement in ^ is more profitable for B than to













50 The first omitted combination would amount to starting the same game in period $, since B will not
respond with phase-out if A docs not play phase-out in ^t. The second omitted combination is similar
to the one-shot game except for sanctioas being imposed on B in jt for not signing.27
(18) supersedes (17). Hence, transfers must match B's incremental costs in each period
and there is no room to prepay B for investments to be undertaken later. Furthermore,
transfers in |t are redundant as an instrument to sustain cooperation. But if they are paid
to get cooperation started, overall transfers will exceed incremental costs.
Hence, stability of the MP requires that the Monetary Fund pays LDCs' incremental
costs and that it does so on the grounds of strict conditionality.
5
1 Moreover, if the costs
of using ozone friendly substances remain permanently higher than the corresponding
costs of using CFCs, then paying transfers to opportunistic countries becomes a
permanent engagement.
7. Who will win the ozone game?
grace period for LDCs is a critical feature of the MP. On the one hand and for the
reasons listed below, the grace period has helped DCs to keep down their transfer
payments to LDCs and to render the trade restrictions against outsiders more credible,
which helps to stabilize the MP.
1. The compliance costs of LDCs after the year 2000 will be lower than those in DCs a
decade earlier, since by that time substitutes will have become available at
decreasing costs. This reduces the need for transfers.
2. Tl^e grace period has reduced the present value of LDCs' compliance costs, since
LDCs tend to have a relatively high rate of time preference. Therefore, the
introduction of the grace period has probably curtailed LDCs' bargaining power,
which has probably helped to keep down the transfers to LDCs.
3. The grace period permitted to conclude an early treaty at a time when LDCs had not
yet developed their production capacities for CFCs and other ozone depleters. Hence,
the threat value of future CFC-emissions by LDCs was lower at the time of
negotiations compared to a possible later situation with substantial CFC production
capacities and related sunk costs in LDCs.
4. Supplying LDCs with CFCs or cheap (subsidized) substitutes during the grace period
and possibly thereafter reduces the risk that LDCs build up an irreversible domestic
CFC production, which would render trade restrictions ineffective and which would
have to be bought out by higher transfers.
5. The early phase-out in DCs renders the envisioned sanctions more credible, since the
costs of a ban on trade in CFCs fall for DCs with the development and immediate
introduction of substitutes and the replacement of the related production equipment
in DCs.
51 At present, the Fund pays for country studies and for reduction projects undertaken by LDCs
voluntarily.28
6. Moreover, selling substitutes is probably more profitable than selling CFCs, which
are easier to imitate by LDCs. A conversion and phase-down programme for CFCs in
LDC that is supported by a successful world-wide ban on CFC exports that de facto
excludes competition from LDCs secures a big export market for DCs' chemical
companies. Thus, trade restrictions against outsiders may prove to be even profitable
instead of costly for DCs.
5
2
On the other hand, the grace period for LDCs has created a problem of time
inconsistency. In combination with DCs
1 transfer payments and trade restrictions against
outsiders it has enticed LDCs to accede to the MP. But as sovereign states, LDCs have
not been able to commit themselves credibly to their phase-out obligations after the
grace period. Whether incremental cost transfers and the MP's trade restrictions will be
sufficient to keep'LDCs from eventually reneging remains an open question. Hence,
DCs have accepted a certain risk, which must be countered in the course of
implementing the MP.
The regular meeting of the Parties to the MP and the concurrent public pressure, which
can be supported by the publication of the official reports, is likely to make the attempt
of serious non-compliance an unpleasant adventure for any government. Reputation
plays an important role in international relations. Since the ozone game is embedded in
a much broader supergame between sovereign states, reneging on the MP can have
negative side effects in other areas of (potential) cooperation. Moreover, elaborated
non-compliance procedures including the imposition of trade restrictions are now
available to rectify individual cases. If LDCs do not collude in breaking the MP and if
the Parties to the MP can deal with non-compliant LDCs separately, which is likely
given the provisions for assistance and the new non-compliance procedures, then
sanctions can be credible. In addition, a widening of the game by resorting to general
principles and enforcement mechanisms of international treaty law remains always
possible.
The stability of the MP can further be enhanced by applying the Monetary Fund
strategically. First, the Fund should be administered on the basis of strict conditionality.
It should pay for real reduction investments, if possible ex post. Second, the Fund
should invest extensively in CFC reductions in LDCs as early as possible already during
the grace period in order to forestall the installation of new CFC production capacities
in LDCs. Third, the Fund should give priority to irreversible investments that build up a
52 The development and expected availability of substitutes was a major reason for the breakthrough in
international negotiations over CFCs. Furthermore, some leading chemical companies, particularly
DuPont in the USA, had eventually realized that a profitable market for CFC substitutes lies ahead.
Hence, the true reason for trade restrictions may well be commercial rather than environmental — and
enforcing the MP may be but a welcome side effect. See Markandya (1991), who emphasizes the
benefits from technology of CFC substitution, and Oberthur (1992), who gives an account of the role
of industry in deciding to abandon CFCs.29
stock of ozone-friendly capital in LDCs that would become obsolete if a country
decided to renege. For instance, investment in new refrigeration equipment that cannot
be run with CFCs are sunk costs that reduce the incentive to breach the MP.
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3 Fourth,
the Fund should be available to pay compensation to loyal Parties for costs that these
incur if sanctions against a non-compliant Party become inevitable. This renders
sanctions more credible.
The MP can be handled very flexibly. The regular revision process allows for an early
adaptation of the MP's provisions to new developments and to looming violations of
treaty obligations. Flexibility has the advantage that unavoidable violations can be
accommodated, which gives the impression that the MP is very stable. But flexibility is
an ambiguous stabilization instrument. It also invites opportunistic parties to force
renegotiations by threatening not to comply. Thus, the eventual outcome need not
necessarily coincide with the provisions of the treaty that was originally agreed upon
and signed. In particular, it is possible that much higher transfers will become necessary
to avoid violations. In the end, it will be difficult to tell whether simply a country's
incapacity to comply or an attempt to exploit its (possibly growing) bargaining power as
a sovereign state was at the origin of an (imminent) violation and thus may have
become the reason for a relaxation and adaptation of the MP's obligations and provision.
When compared with non-sovereign contractual relations, the latter behaviour would, of
course, have to be rated as a clear breach of the original treaty, although it is not
1
9 observable as such.
To conclude, the ozone game is characterized by an unevenly distributed bargaining
power to the advantage of LDCs. If LDCs built up their production capacity and
consumption of CFCs and other ozone depleting substances only moderately, they could
easily offset all reduction efforts by DCs. Moreover, LDCs could perhaps do this at
relatively small environmental costs to themselves but with inflicting potentially large
damage on DCs. The ozone layer problem can thus be used for global blackmail.
It seems that LDCs have so far abstained form using this power. If they had formed a
cartel in negotiations, they might have been able to exploit their favourable position in
- order to obtain higher sidepayments, perhaps in the form of development aid. In the
long-run, the cooperative Nash bargaining outcome may reflect the distribution of the
bargaining power more correctly and may thus be closer to a sustainable distribution of
the gains from protecting the ozone layer than the financial provisions in the MP.
Hence, it seems that DCs have outfoxed the Developing World over the ozone issue.
Particularly two of the celebrated new elements in the MP can be held responsible for
this success: the provision for sanctions against non-Parties in combination with the
53 Compare Stiihlcr (1992).grace period for LDCs. The monopsonist cartel of DCs vis a vis the many LDCs may
have done the rcst.
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We must leave the question open whether the MP can eventually be called, a success
story. We will have to wait and see which position LDCs will take at the turn of the
century. There are many loopholes and weak provisions in the MP. It remains to be seen
in how far LDCs will want and are able to use these opportunities for creeping out of
their phase-out obligations and how high incremental costs and monetary and non-
monetary transfers will finally be. Nevertheless, it seems that the MP stands a good
chance of being honoured eventually — and at a very moderate price for the industrial
half of the world.
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